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Kingston: Constitutional Law - Does the New Death Qualification Standard En

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Does the New Death Qualification Standard
Ensure a Biased Jury? Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985).
On October 28, 1973, Johnny Paul Witt and a friend committed a
murder. They waited in a wooded area and, when an eleven year old boy
rode by on his bicycle, the accomplice hit the boy on the head. The two
gagged the stunned victim, put him in the trunk of their car, and drove
to a deserted area. When they opened the trunk, they discovered the victim had choked on the gag and died. The pair performed sexual and violent
acts on the body and buried it.1

Witt was convicted of first degree murder in Florida and the jury
sentenced him to death.' At Witt's trial eleven jurors were recused for
cause. His attorney unsuccessfully contended on appeal in the state courts
that three of these veniremen were improperly recused based on the recusal
standard outlined in Witherspoon v. Illinois.3 Witt raised the same issue
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in United States District Court.
His petition was denied. 4 The Court of Appeals reversed and granted the
writ.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 6 and subsequently rejected
Witt's Witherspoon claim.7 The Witt Court developed a new standard for
voir dire and recusal of veniremen in a capital case. This author contends
that the Witt standard denies the defendant due process because a Witt
jury will be more likely to convict and sentence the defendant to death
than a jury seated under Witherspoon.
1. Witt v. State, 342 S.2d 497 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
2. Id
3. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Recusal is the process by which veniremen are removed from
the jury either for cause (prejudice either for or against the defendant) or preemptorily.
4. State v. Witt, No. 74-181 (7th Dist., Fla. Feb. 21, 1974) (memorandum decision).
5. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (11th
Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985).
6. Wainwright v. Witt, 466 U.S. 957 (1984).
7. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985).
The Court also held that the determination of venireman opposition to the death penalty is a factual and not a legal question. Id at 855. Therefore, on habeas review, the trial
judge's determination must be afforded a "presumption of correctness." Federal Courts on
habeas review must defer to this finding, and apply a narrower standard of review. The federal
habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made
by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the state or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate
written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct.
The U.S. Supreme Court has deferred to the trial court's finding of fact in other cases. See
Patton v. Yount, 104 S.Ct. 2885 (1984). The Patton Court found the issue of whether pretrial publicity had created prejudice in a venireman a factual issue to be accorded section
2254(d)'s presumption of correctness. See also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). Rushen
v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). But see Irwin v. Doud,
366 U.S. 717 (1961), where the Court held the question of the effect of pre-trial publicity
on juror prejudice to be a mixed question of law and fact requiring de novo habeas review.
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BACKGROUND

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." In Duncan v. Louisiana the
U.S. Supreme Court ranked the right to an impartial jury trial among
those which are fundamental to our American scheme of justice. The Duncan Court was convinced that a general grant of a jury in trials for serious
offenses was mandatory to prevent miscarriages of justice and for insuring that defendants obtained fair trials. 9
The Court has recognized that an essential component of the guarantee
of an impartial jury trial is that the jury be composed of a fair cross-section
of the community.' 0 A criminal defendant must be assured that his case
will be judged not by some isolated social, economic, or political segment
of the community. Rather, jurors of all backgrounds, perspectives and
viewpoints should hear his case. The Supreme Court in Witherspoon v.
Illinois applied this reasoning to the issue of juror recusal in death-penalty
cases."
in Witherspoon, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a new standard
for death-qualifying a jury. Prior to Witherspoon, a venireman might
be recused in a capital case merely because he generally opposed the death
penalty or if he had scruples 3 against its infliction. On this basis, fortyseven veniremen were successfully challenged for cause at Witherspoon's
trial. The Court reversed Witherspoon's death sentence1 4 because the
death-qualification procedure violated Witherspoon's sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights to an impartial jury. 5 The Court held that a capital
case jury may not be cleansed of those who generally oppose the death
penalty or those who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against
8. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
9. Id at 157-58. Consequently, the Court held that this right has been "incorporated"
by the fourteenth amendment so as to apply to the states.
10. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The argument may be made that Taylor
and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), only guarantee the accused a venire which is
composed of a fair cross-section of the community; but, Witherspoon, Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38 (1970), and even Witt extend this right to a petite jury as well. In Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court held that this right is also "incorporated" so as to apply to
the states.
11. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-20.
12. A "death-qualified" jury is simply one which is qualified to sit in a capital case.
In other words, those jurors unqualified to sit because of their opposition to the death penalty
have been recused.
13. A "death-scrupled" venireman, in the context of this note, is one who is not irrevocably opposed to the death penalty, but who has some conscientious or religious scruples
against it.
14. A Witherspoon reversal only reverses and remands for a new sentencing hearing.
The jury's finding of guilt is not disturbed.
15. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518. Justice Stewart, writing in Witherspoon, focused
on the issue of juror-impartiality. He did not analyze the problem in terms of whether or
not such a jury represented a fair cross-section of the community. See Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). Justice Douglas,
concurring in Witherspoon, focused on the fair cross-section element.
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it, 6 but who might return the death penalty in certain circumstances. The
Court was convinced that such a sanitized jury would be a "hanging jury"
quick to convict and quick to return the death penalty, thus denying the
defendant due process.
The Court also developed a test which has provided the standard for
capital case juror recusal. Only those jurors who make it unmistakably
clear that they would (1) automatically vote against the death penalty
without regard for the evidence, or (2) whose attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from being impartial as to the defendant's
guilt (those who would vote not guilty or guilty to a lesser charge) can
be recused.17 Since Witherspoon, the state and federal courts have consistently followed this test.'8
In 1980, however, the Supreme Court in Adams v. Texas 9 slightly
modified the Witherspoon standard. The Adams Court reversed the death
sentence of a habeas petitioner. Justice White wrote that states may only
exclude veniremen whose beliefs regarding capital punishment would lead
them to ignore the judge's instructions or to violate their oaths as jurors. 0
Though the Adams Court reversed on the basis of the Witherspoon doctrine' the Court departed from strict adherence to the Witherspoon test.
Under Adams, a prosecutor may have a venireman recused for cause if
his views about capital punishment would prevent or "substantially impair" his ability to convict or return the death penalty.2
In some respects, the Adams "test" significantly differs from the
Witherspoon test. The Witherspoon test demands that the venireman be
impartial and that he at least consider the death penalty. Adams merges
and simplifies this two-prong inquiry by requiring only that the juror
adhere to the judge's instructions. Adams also does not require, as does
16. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522.
17. Id. at 522 n.21. The test was:
Nothing we say today bears upon the power of a state to execute a defendant
sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact
excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard
to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them,
or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from
making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Witherspoon reversals are not very common. In his brief on the merits, Witt indicated that
between 1980-83 the federal and state courts reached the Witherspoon issue in 175 cases.
The courts reversed the death sentence 26 times-14.9%. Brief of Petitioner on the Merits
(appendix pp. la-7a), Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985). For examples of Witherspoon
reversals see Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981); People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d
327, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983); Chandler v. State, 442 S.2d 171 (Fla. 1983).
18. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
19. Id. Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in Adams. His majority opinion in
Witt does not differ in any significant fashion from his dissent in Adams.
20. In Texas, a capital case juryman must swear that the mandatory penalty of death
or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
21. The Adams court quoted Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one verbatim. Adams, 448
U.S. at 44.
22. Id. at 45. Thus, Adams incorporates the Witherspoon test as well as adding the
impairment "substantial" test.
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Witherspoon, that the venireman make unmistakably clear his opposition
to the death penalty.
Most importantly, Adams allows a venireman to be recused if his
beliefs regarding the death penalty substantially impairhis ability to perform his duties as a juror in a capital case. Under Witherspoon only those
veniremen whose beliefs would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt may be recused. The Adams test allows
a larger class of veniremen to be recused.
Arguably, the Adams Court did not intend to change the Witherspoon
test. The Court's use of the phrase "substantially impair" is, if anything,
a description of the Witherspoon doctrine in slightly different words. The
significance of the change is only evident in retrospect. Neither Justices
Brennan or Marshall, who in Witt vociferously castigate the Witt majority
for departing from the Witherspoon test, objected to the use of the phrase
in Adams. Either Justice White had a "hidden agenda" in Adams or he
done when he exdid not realize the potential significance of what he had
2
pressed the Court's position in the way that he did. 1
Despite the shift in Adams from the Witherspoon standard, both
Adams and Witherspoon support the general proposition that the recusal
standard in capital cases should be significantly different from the recusal
standard in other kinds of trials. In a capital case, the state might only
recuse veniremen who are demonstrably biased in the defendant's favor.
The Witherspoon Court was convinced that a death-qualified jury would
to return a verdict of death as well as "organized to conbe organized
4
vict."1
The Court in Witherspoon forthrightly recognized that a verdict of
death returned by such a jury is unconstitutional because the jury is not
impartial. To execute a defendant under such circumstances would deprive
the defendant of his life without due process of law. The Witt Court,
however, rejected this perspective and fundamentally redefined the process of voir dire in a death penalty case.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

The Witt Court25 first examined Witt's contention that three of the
recused veniremen were improperly recused for cause. The court below
granted the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus based on the voir dire colloquy between the prosecutor and Venireman Colby. The colloquy is indicative of the confusion that pervades voir dire in general and death
23. Justice White joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Witt.
24. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. The Court's position was also predicated on an
awareness of the growing unpopularity of the death penalty. It noted that in 1966, approximately 42% of the public favored capital punishment, while 47% opposed it. Id at 520, n.16.
25. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985). Rehnquist wrote, joined by Burger C.J.,
White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor. Stevens concurred in the judgment and wrote
separately. Brennan and Marshall dissented.
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qualification of a capital case venire in particular. The exchange illustrates
the difficulty in accurately discovering a venireman's belief about the
death penalty:
"[Q. prosecutor]: Now, let me ask you a question, ma'am. Do you
have any religious beliefs or personal beliefs against the death
penalty?
"[A. Colby]: I am afraid personally, but not

"[Q.]: Speak up, please.
"[A.]: I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely not
religious.
"[Q.]: Now, would that interfere with you sitting as a juror in this
case?
"[A.]: I am afraid it would.
"[Q.]: You are afraid it would?
"[A.J: Yes, sir.
"[Q.]: Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the
Defendant in this case?
"[A.]: I think so.
"[Q.]: You think it would?
"[A.]: I think it would.
"[Q.]: Your honor, I would move for cause at this point.
"The Court: All right. Step down. "26
The Court of Appeals reversed Witt's death sentence because the prosecutor used the word "interfere" in questioning the venireman.2 7 The Court
of Appeals said that the word "interfere" would admit to more than one
meaning. Because the question was ambiguous, the venireman had not
made it "unmistakably clear" that her attitude would prevent her from
impartially deciding Witt's guilt. The Supreme Court was critical of the
Court of Appeals' rigid adherence to form. The Court would allow prosecutors to ask the relevant voir dire questions without the requirement
that they be framed exclusively in Witherspoon language.2 8
The Witt Court was unconcerned with whether the colloquy was ambiguous, or whether the voir dire violated Witherspoon's textual and
substantive requirements. No longer may a venireman be excluded only
when he would "automatically" vote against the death penalty, nor must
the venireman's expression of belief be "unambiguous" or "unmistakably
26. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
27. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1082 (1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (1lth Cir.
1984), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985). See supra note 16.
28. Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 857.
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clear. ' ' 29 The Court specifically rejected the Witherspoon standard and
adopted that of Adams v. Texas.2 0
The Witt Court persuasively reasoned that the Adams standard is
preferable to the Witherspoon test. Justice Rehnquist noted that Witherspoon's two-prong testing of the venireman's attitude toward guilt and
sentencing had been merged and simplified in Adams.3 In addition,
Witherspoon's
high standard of proof of venireman incompetence is not
32
required.

Justice Rehnquist urged that Adams is superior because it accords
with the traditional reasons for excluding jurors in any kind of case (an
approach Witherspoon implicitly rejected in the capital case context). The
majority in Witt rejects any distinction between recusal standards for
capital and noncapital cases. An "impartial" jury in any case is one which
is biased neither for nor against the defendant. The Witt Court was convinced that a jury death-qualified under Witherspoon produces a jury
biased in the defendant's favor.
The Witt Court's strongest argument for adopting the Adams standard is the change in death penalty statutes from the Witherspoon era
to those of today. In the Witherspoon era, a capital sentencing jury was
vested with nearly complete discretion in sentencing. After Gregg v.
Georgia 33 in contrast, a capital case jury is strictly guided by the trial
court in its sentencing determination. It may sentence only within the
statutory scheme. Under Gregg, the jury may return the death penalty
only if it finds one or more aggravating circumstances. The Witt Court
reasoned that recusal of a wide class of death-scrupled veniremen will not
violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial jury
because the jury is not free to vote its prejudices but can return a verdict
of death only in a narrow range of circumstances.
CRITIQUE

As already shown, the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury composed
of a fair cross-section of the community. A jury death-qualified under Witt
violates these rights. Death qualification under Witt works only to the
advantage of the prosecutor regarding conviction and sentencing.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Witt, argued that the Witt standard
produces a biased jury from which an identifiable segment of the community has been excluded.
29. Id
30. Id. at 851.

31. Id.
32. Id
33. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For example, in Wyoming a death sentence may be imposed
only if the jury finds an aggravating circumstance in the circumstances of the crime. Among
others, these include: the defendant was a prisoner, he had already been convicted of murder,
the victim was a police officer. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1977).
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This conclusion is supported by extensive socio-psychological data adduced in many jury studies.34 Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Witt, noted
these studies but did not base his dissent on them. The federal circuits
have taken note of the issue raised by the jury studies and are in conflict
as to whether death-qualification produces biased juries in the prosecution's favor. Justice Marshall, dissenting to a denial of a stay of execution in Witt's case, asserted that the high Court must soon take up the
3

issue to resolve the conflict.

1

With only a single exception,3 6 researchers find a strong correlation
between conviction proneness and death-qualified juries. For example,
Ellsworth and Fitzgerald report that even a jury death-qualified under
Witherspoon is more punitive, less sensitive to the defendant's constitutional guarantees, less equitable in its evaluation of defendant's counsel
and more willing to ignore the judge's instructions. According to their
research, death-qualified juries are more favorable to the prosecution than
37

juries in any other kind of case.

Death-qualified jurors hold the prosecution to a lesser standard of proof,38 are more likely to be prejudiced against the defendant's assertion of
his fifth amendment privilege 3 9 are more likely to support punitive as opposed to reformatory measures against defendants," and generally favor
the prosecution counsel over the defendant's counsel. 4' In comparison, the
Witherspoon-excludable juror is more concerned with the maintenance of
34. In Witherspoon, the Court had before it three studies purporting to show that the
exclusion of death-scrupled jurors produced a conviction prone jury. W.C. Wilson, Belief in
Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (1964) (unpublished manuscript); F.J. Goldberg,
Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as a Juror in Simulated Capital Cases
(undated) (unpublished manuscript) (since published as Goldberg, Toward Expansion of
Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise
Presumptionsin the Law, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970)); H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON
JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968). The Court found the data too tentative and fragmentary to establish the proposition. The Court "invited" better proof of
the proposition. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520, n.18.
35. Witt v. Wainwright, 105 S.Ct. 1415, 1417 (1985). Courts rejecting the claim on habeas
review include: Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984); McClesky v. Kemp, 753
F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978). Federal
courts accepting the argument include: Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark.
1983); Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom, Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S.Ct. 59 (1985). The California Supreme Court has considered the jury studies
in detail. The court was impressed with the fact that the results of all the studies were consistent even though the test subjects included southern college students, northern industrial
workers, Illinois or New York jurors, California jurors, or a nationwide sample. Hovey v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 23 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
36. Osser & Bernstein, The Death Oriented Jury Shall Live, 1 SAN FERN. V.L. REV.
253 (1968). This study has been severely criticized for methodological error. Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Juror'sPredispositionto Convict
and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Cowan].
37. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process v. Crime ControL Death Qualificationand Jury
Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 48 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Fitzgerald].
38. Id. at 42.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 43-44.
41. Id.
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of the Constitution, less punitive,
the fundamental due process guarantees
42
and less mistrusting of the defense.

In a related study,"' the same authors found the best single predictor
of juror sentencing is his attitude toward the death penalty (the other
predictors analyzed being age, sex, education, previous juror experience,
and income)." The more committed the juror is to death as a valid sanction, the greater the likelihood he will return a verdict of death regardless
of the circumstances of the case. The authors found that mixed juries45
were more critical of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and collectively had a better memory for all the evidence in a case. 46 Clearly a
jury death-qualified under Witt will be even more biased toward the
defendant.
Research also shows that death-qualified juries do not represent a fair
cross section of the community. Certain significant segments of society
are disproportionately removed from juries by the process of death
qualification. A person's attitude toward the death penalty is a reliable
indicator of a cluster of social/political attitudes ranging across the whole
spectrum of criminal justice issues.47
Death-qualified juries do not represent the population as a whole or
the communities of which they are a part. They are not a jury of the defendant's peers. Research shows that seventeen percent of the population
is excludable under the Witherspoon standard.4 8 The process of death
qualification excludes more women, blacks, Jews, and atheists, more of
the poor, and twice as many Democrats as Republicans. 491 This group
represents a significant segment of the population, the exclusion of which
violates the right of the accused to a jury composed of a fair cross section
of the community."
All of these jury studies point to the same conclusion-the defendant's
due process rights are violated by a death-qualified jury." Though not
all capital case juries will manifest the constitutional deficiences outlined
here, as long as some defendants are prejudiced, a death-qualified jury
is constitutionally invalid.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id at 46, 48.
Cowan, supra note 36.
Id. at 74.
Mixed juries are those composed of both Witherspoon excludables and death-

qualified jurors.
46. Cowan, supra note 36, at 77.
47. Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 43.
48. Id at 42.
49. Id at 46.
50. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
51. In addition to those studies already mentioned, other research which supports this
conclusion includes: Bronson, On the Conviction Pronenessand Representativeness of the
Death-QualifiedJury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L.

REV.

1

(1970); Jurow, New Dataon the Effect of a "Death-Qualified"Juryon the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971).
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Wyoming criminal procedure incorporates Witherspoon into statute.
The statute requires that, in a capital case, a venireman be recused for
cause if "his opinions are such as to preclude him from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death." 52
The Wyoming Supreme Court has faced the issue of death qualification in five cases. 3 Three of these cases were decided before Witherspoon
and reflect the liberal recusal standard of that era.54 In Sims v. State,55
however, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Witherspoon is the
recusal standard in Wyoming.
In Hopkinson v. State,5 (Hopkinson I) the Wyoming Supreme Court
affirmed Sims. The court rejected the defendant's claim that it is unconstitutional to allow Witherspoon-excludablesto be recused. The court
reasoned that if the state were precluded from recusing those veniremen
from the jury who were adamantly opposed to the death penalty then the
death penalty would not be imposed. 7
What the Wyoming courts or legislature will do post-Witt is an open
question. The Wyoming Supreme Court has found Witherspoon's exposition of federal law presumptively correct in Wyoming. The state is bound
to comply with federal constitutional standards. Despite this requirement,
the state may, if it chooses, provide its criminal defendants with a greater
58
measure of due process protection than the federal constitution requires.
The U.S. Supreme Court's power to review state court judgments is
limited to those which involve federal questions.5 9 The Court has consistently upheld the "adequate and independent state ground" doctrine.
Under this rule the Court will refuse to exercise its jurisdiction over final
state court judgments involving a federal question if there is a nonfederal
ground sufficiently broad 6 0 independent,6 1 and tenable 61 to support the
52. WYo. STAT. § 7-11-105(a)(iii) (1977).
53. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981); Sims v. State, 496 P.2d 185 (Wyo.
1972); Pixley v. State, 406 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 1965); State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 285 P. 803
(1930); Loy v. State, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796 (1919).
54. Pixley v. State, 406 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 1965); State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 285 P.
803 (1930); Loy v. State, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796 (1919).
55. 496 P.2d 185, 188 (Wyo. 1972). The court's holding was also based on its reading
of state law.
56. 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981).
57. Id. at 158.
58. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1974). The Wyoming Constitution guarantees to the defendant that "[tihe right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in
criminal cases.... WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Also, "Jin all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury ...... WYo.CONST. art. 1, § 10.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1983).
60. Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U.S. 494 (1875).
61. Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917).
62. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 15

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

judgment.63 The Oregon Supreme Court in Sterling v. Cupp6 4 outlined a

proper sequence of review when a defendant bases his challenge of his
conviction on state and federal law. The court reasoned that state law,
including its constitution, must first be analyzed before reaching the
federal constitutional claim.65 In Michigan v. Long,66 however, the Supreme
Court made plain what it would demand of decisions of state courts which
predicate the grant of a right on both federal and state grounds. The state
court must indicate clearly and expressly the alternative and independent
state ground in which its 6decision
lies or the Supreme Court will assert
7

jurisdiction over the case.

The Wyoming Supreme Court has found its role in constitutional interpretation to encompass review of both the state and federal constitutions. In Richmond v. State,68 the court said that federal constitutional
guarantees, as announced by the United States Supreme Court, are
minimal, and the state constitution and laws may provide a broader locus
of procedural rights for criminal defendants. In other cases focusing on
the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, the Wyoming court has
explicated
the right solely in terms of Wyoming constitutional guar69
antees.

In the area of juror recusal in capital cases, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has held that unwillingness of a juror to inflict the death penalty
under any circumstances would constitute an unwillingness to execute
the laws of the State. The Pixley court's delineation of the Witherspoon
doctrine in state terms satisfies the Michigan v. Long requirement that
the independent state ground be clearly expressed. Because Wyoming incorporates the Witherspoon standard into state law it meets the minimal
federal requirements of Wainwright v. Witt. Consequently, Witt will have
no effect on this provision of Wyoming criminal procedure unless the
Wyoming legislature changes the statute. In any future case the Wyoming Supreme Court may continue to provide its capital defendants with
a greater measure of due process guarantees by finding the right within
the Wyoming, rather than the federal, Constitution.
CONCLUSION

Witt v. Wainwright represents a significant change in the standard
by which juries are "death-qualified." The issue affects the state which
is concerned with the effective enforcement of its laws, and the defendant
whose life is at stake. The state, faced with a jury which has not been
63. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:State Court Evasion of the
Burger Cour 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 427, 430 (1974). See also Linde, El Pluribus-Constitutional
Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Brennan, State Constitutionsand the
Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
64. 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
65. Id at 614, 625 P.2d at 126.
66. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
67. Id. at 1041.
68. 554 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Wyo. 1976).
69. Pixley v. State, 406 P.2d 662 (1965), cited with approval in, Hopkinson v. State,
632 P.2d 79, 158 (Wyo. 1981).
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death-qualified, might well find it impossible to obtain a conviction or
death sentence. A death penalty state might certainly argue only those
who can return the ultimate sanction-only those who can follow the lawought to sit on capital case juries. A juror who adamantly opposed the
death penalty could not honor his oath if state law allows for capital
punishment.
The defendant's interests are at least as great, if not greater, than
those of the state. The holding in Witt has prejudiced the defendant's due
process right to a fair and impartial jury composed of a fair cross-section
of the community. Henceforth, a capital defendant faces a suspicious, intolerant and punitive jury which cares more for its collective interests than
his due process guarantees. The United States Supreme Court must soon
directly face the issues raised by the conviction-proneness studies. 0
On March 6, 1985 Johnny Paul Witt was executed in the Florida electric chair."
TIMOTHY KINGSTON

70. On Oct. 7, 1985 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S.Ct. 59 (1985) to hear petitioner's claim that juror recusal under Witt produces a conviction and death prone jury.
71. Telephone interview with the Information Department, Florida Department of Corrections (February 17, 1986).
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